China and the Belt and Road in Central Asia ^{CEFR B1}

Over the last two decades China has become a major diplomatic, trade and political actor in Central Asia. Global Voices spoke with Elzbieta Pron, an Assistant Professor at the University of Silesia in Katowice who researches China–Central Asia relations, about how this cooperation developed. China has funded projects such as electric vehicle production, waste processing, renewable energy and mining.

China first framed the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Analysts often call Central Asia a testing ground for Chinese strategies. The region is close enough for projects and security cooperation, but it is politically and culturally different, which creates diplomatic challenges. Geography matters too: Kazakhstan shares a long border with China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and offers a route toward the Caucasus and Europe.

After Russia formed the Customs Union in 2010, institutionalized in 2015 as the Eurasian Economic Union, trade with Russia became easier but trade with China was more difficult. Many Central Asian states favour multi‑vector policies and used Chinese finance and construction to join global transport and trade networks. Most governments are relatively stable and authoritarian, making them predictable partners, although Kyrgyzstan is an exception. China’s interest in renewables has domestic and diplomatic goals: hydropower is about 15 percent of Chinese energy, and Chinese solar and wind projects also showcase technology and partnerships. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, both rich in gas and oil, have shown growing interest in renewables over the past five to six years; Uzbekistan is active in hydropower on the Pskem River as of 2025. Pron expects China to remain an active promoter of BRI projects, while governments try to keep their independence and sometimes revoke parts of undisclosed deals after public pushback.