China and the Belt and Road in Central Asia ^{CEFR B2}

In the past twenty years China has expanded its diplomatic, trade and political footprint in Central Asia by financing infrastructure and industrial projects across the region. These projects include electric vehicle production, waste processing, renewable energy installations and mining. Global Voices interviewed Elzbieta Pron, an Assistant Professor who studies China–Central Asia relations, about how cooperation has grown under the Belt and Road Initiative, which China first framed in 2013.

Analysts often describe Central Asia as a testing ground for Chinese strategies: the region is close enough for practical projects and security cooperation, yet politically and culturally different, which creates diplomatic challenges. Geography also plays a role. Kazakhstan shares a long border with China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and provides a land route toward the Caucasus and Europe. The rise of the Russian Customs Union in 2010, institutionalized in 2015 as the Eurasian Economic Union, eased trade with Russia but complicated trade with China. Many Central Asian states pursue multi‑vector foreign policies and aim to turn their landlocked position into an advantage by joining global transport and trade networks; Chinese finance and construction fit those aims.

Most governments in the region are relatively stable and authoritarian, making them predictable partners for long‑term projects, though Kyrgyzstan is a noted exception. Popular Sinophobic sentiments exist but have so far had limited impact on official relations. China’s interest in renewable energy has domestic and diplomatic dimensions: domestically it seeks energy diversification because coal supplies are large but limited, and hydropower now accounts for about 15 percent of its energy. Externally, Chinese‑built solar and wind projects act as political tools that demonstrate China’s technological role and its partnership commitment.

Reception of renewables in Central Asia has changed recently. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, both resource‑rich in gas and oil, have shown substantial interest in renewables over the past five to six years. Uzbekistan is active in hydropower development along the Pskem River as of 2025. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan long had hydropower potential but lacked funds and investor security to develop many projects earlier. Looking ahead, Pron expects China to remain an active promoter of BRI projects in Central Asia. Governments are likely to continue pragmatic cooperation while guarding their independence, and public pushback sometimes forces local authorities to revoke pro‑Chinese deals, land leases or parts of agreements that were not widely disclosed.