China’s growing role and the backlash in Kyrgyzstan ^{CEFR B2}

In recent years China has become Kyrgyzstan’s principal external economic partner: it is the main creditor, the largest investor and the biggest trading partner. The two states upgraded bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2023, and Chinese cooperation touches mining, agriculture, energy, transport and other sectors.

That expanding presence has repeatedly sparked backlash. The reaction has included street protests, violent clashes, raids on businesses and campaigns to find and deport so-called "illegal" migrants. Researchers cite data showing that over two-thirds of region-wide protests from 2018 to 2021 targeting foreign actors were aimed at China. The most intense violence occurred in October 2020, amid contested elections that created a power vacuum; Chinese businesses were attacked, plants were burned and workers faced extortion. In 2020 the government cancelled a $280 million logistics terminal on the border with China after local protests.

Environmental and health complaints have driven much of the anger and hardened public perceptions. Chinese-owned firms in oil, gas and mining have been accused of pollution, toxic leaks and damage to water supplies and crops. Reported incidents include fines for emissions at the Junda refinery in Kara-Balta and livestock deaths near the Solton-Sary gold mine run by Zhong Ji. Fear of large-scale migration and loss of control over land also fuel concerns: there are roughly 9,000 Chinese workers in Kyrgyzstan, though rumours claim nearly 100,000, and China holds over one-third of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign debt.

Political actors amplified these themes: populist Sadyr Japarov criticised Chinese influence before becoming president in 2020, and more violent nationalist groups such as Kyrk Choro have carried out raids. Chinese nationalist claims about 19th century borders and policies in Xinjiang have also shaped sentiment. The Kyrgyz government’s approach changed after 2020: it tightened controls on civil society and media, and protests have been banned in central Bishkek since March 2022. Polling from the Central Asia Barometer shows negative opinions of China fell from almost 50 percent in 2020 to just over 25 percent today, though observers offer several possible explanations for that decline.

China has responded by increasing security assistance and by allowing foreign private security companies to operate; at least six now work in Kyrgyzstan, and Zhongjun Junhong Group received a firearms permit in 2016. Beijing has also boosted soft-power and skills initiatives: three Confucius Institutes, scholarships and new vocational "Luban" workshops. The Bishkek Luban Workshop, opened in 2024 and focused on hydropower and road construction, signals a shift toward training and higher-value investment to improve China’s image.